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Franchise jobs are often described as representing the epitome of the "low road" approach to managing
employees: high turnover, little training, deskilled jobs, and little employee involvement, practices
often seen as unsophisticated.  Research on franchise operations suggests, however, that the basic operating
principles and practices of franchises tend to be more sophisticated than those of equivalent independent
operators.  We might therefore expect their employee management practices to be more advanced
as well, challenging the stereotype of franchise jobs. We use data from a national probability sample
of establishments to examine the relationship between franchise status and employment practices.
While descriptive statistics suggest that franchise operations use low road practices, once industry,
size, and other control variables are included in the analysis, franchise operations appear on important
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Franchises are an important part of the U.S. economy. There are an estimated 1,500 
franchise companies operating in the U.S. doing business through 320,000 retail units (see 
International Franchise Association estimates). Our data, described in more detail below, 
suggests that they represent about five percent of all establishments in the U.S. Franchises 
represent an alternative to traditional forms of business operations. They signify a legal 
agreement where the independent franchisee sells a product or service using the brand name 
and/or operating system of the franchisor, typically in return for a lump sum payment and annual 
royalty fee (Shane, 1996, Shane & Foo, 2001). 
Franchises have a market-like aspect due to the exchange of capital and products between 
the franchisor and the franchisee; they also have a hierarchical aspect due to the uniform 
operating procedures set by the franchisor (Norton, 1988).  Franchises also represent a hybrid 
between the attributes of small and large-scale operations in that they function with some 
autonomy as independent establishments but are also part of a much larger franchise 
organization. The product or service’s image, marketing, and basic operating practices are 
produced most efficiently in large scale by the parent (Rubin, 1978), while the actual production 
of the goods and services is most efficient when it is decentralized to the place of consumption 
(Caves and Murphy, 1976).  
The management of employees and work organization issues is central to most franchise 
operating procedures, in part because franchises are especially common in services where labor 
content is the crucial component.  And the popular image of franchises is that they provide low-
quality jobs.  We consider the conceptual arguments behind that position and then examine it 
empirically in the analyses below.      4
Franchises and Employment Practices: 
The descriptive literature on franchises reinforces the idea that franchises provide low-
quality jobs (e.g. Zuber, 1997; Matusky, 1998; Schaaf, 1994; Feuer, 1988), although most of that 
work is anecdotal.  Franchise outlets appear to make extensive use of part-time and temporary 
employees (Leidner, 1993) and do not invest much in recruiting because they do not expect 
employees to be with the organization for a very long time (Royle, 1998). They also appear to 
pay low wages. Royle (1998), for example, emphasizes the huge disparity between the US 
average wage and the starting wage at McDonald’s. Benefits like health insurance and sick days 
are entirely absent at some franchise operations (Leidner, 1993). Franchise operations are 
marked by a very high rate of turnover that can reach 300 per cent per year (Krueger, 1991).   
While the practitioner-oriented literature hails the effectiveness and superiority of 
training practices of franchises (e.g. Zuber, 1997; Matusky, 1998; Schaaf, 1994; Feuer, 1988), 
Litz and Stewart (2000) survey 307 hardware stores in a trade name franchise chain and question 
whether franchises train more than independent stores.  Whether workers actually learn much 
from franchise training is another open question. Wildavsky (1999) asserts that fast food 
franchise workers learn both job-related skills, such as how to operate a cash register or train 
others, and general, transferable skills such as teamwork, customer service or getting along with 
coworkers; Leidner (1993), on the other hand, points out that the training for making French 
fries, for example, consisted of simply watching a short videotape, and the most skilled job, 
window work, demanded only three to four hours of total training time (Leidner, 1993). 
Among the larger and more sophisticated franchises, such as McDonald’s, there is at least 
a priori evidence suggesting that the basic approach to management – generating standardized 
“best practices” and transferring them across organizations - bears a great deal of similarity to   5
that of scientific management. Frederick Taylor’s model for organizing production work began 
by systematically gathering up the tacit knowledge of production held by skilled workers and 
organizing it into precise, formalized rules that defined the performance of each specific task 
performed by every individual worker (see Taylor, 1947 for a discussion).  The effect of 
scientific management approaches on worker-level outcomes, particularly skill requirements, is 
extremely well documented: Because knowledge is built into rules, procedures, and systems, 
individual workers no longer need to have that knowledge, and job requirements fall.  (See 
Braverman, 1974 for the seminal work and Attewell, 1987 for a review.)  Less-skilled workers, 
who are cheaper, can be hired into these de-skilled jobs and then trained to follow the 
standardized approaches.  Leidner’s (1993) ethnography of franchise operations argues that their 
routinization of work practices leads to tight managerial control, detailed job descriptions, and 
plenty of specifications and regulations, very much like scientific management.   
Hierarchical and bureaucratic forms of supervision and control have an independent 
effect on limiting the autonomy of employees by transferring decision making up the hierarchy 
(e.g., Perrow 1972; Edwards 1978). The franchise model, where the design and control over 
operating procedures lies at the franchisor headquarters, very much resembles a bureaucratic 
control system.  Bureaucratic systems of control through hierarchy are also part of the scientific 
management approach, as the design and control of jobs is separated from the execution of work 
and transferred to layers of industrial engineers and supervisors. In the case of highly specialized 
jobs, for example, it is difficult for workers to coordinate their work with others on their own 
because they often lack the knowledge and the links to do that. Further, highly specialized work 
is less intrinsically motivating, which again increases the need for hierarchical supervision   6
(Lawler, 1988).  The practices of scientific management and the practice of hierarchical control 
systems both limit the autonomy and control of employees.  
Scientific management implies different outcomes for franchise management jobs, 
however, as managers may need greater skill to execute the operating practices. Parcel and 
Sickmeier (1988) highlight how McDonald’s simultaneously uses a secondary labor market for 
front-line workers with low entry criteria, low wages, low degree of autonomy and little 
employment stability, and an upper-tier labor market with high wages and benefits and clear 
lines of promotion to attract managers with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to develop and 
maintain these routines.  
One argument reconciling why franchises could have more sophisticated management 
practices in general and apparently unsophisticated low road employment practices would be that 
they rely on these scientific management principles.  The poor employment outcomes for front-
line workers could be part of an intentional strategy.  A great deal of contemporary research in 
human resources and industrial relations, however, has emphasized the considerable advantages 
for employers of “high commitment” or “high performance” work systems associated with 
greater worker involvement and participatory decision processes (e.g. Berg, 1999; Berg, 
Kalleberg and Appelbaum, 2003).  High performance work practices, which focus on employee 
involvement and team work arrangements, also tend to be accompanied by supporting programs 
such as worker training (Osterman 1994). Wages for workers employed in high commitment 
systems are higher than those employed by traditional organizations, especially for managers, 
supervisors, and technical workers in unionized establishments (Black, Lynch and Krivelyova, 
2004).  While the early studies on high commitment work systems showed benefits associated 
with individual performance, the more recent studies demonstrate effects associated with firm-  7
level outcomes in services as well as the more typical manufacturing settings (e.g., Combs, Liu, 
Hall and Ketchen, 2006; Preuss 2003).   
If the essence of franchise management is to identify effective management practices, 
standardize and distribute them across franchise outlets, then it is not obvious why franchise 
operations would not also include high performance work practices in their portfolio.  Further, it 
is not obvious that the descriptive literature on franchise jobs is definitive.  Most of the studies 
that point out the poor quality of employment practices at franchises focuses on fast food outlets, 
especially McDonald’s (e.g. Love, 1985; Parcel and Sickmeier, 1988; Leidner, 1993; Royle, 
1998 and 2000).  Many of the characteristics of jobs at those franchises appear to be common to 
all fast food jobs. The franchises that were examined in these studies also tend to be relatively 
small operations, and small firms often lack the resources to develop human resource practices 
like training (Kalleberg et al, 1996; Litz and Stewart, 2000). Vickerstaff (1992) found, for 
example, that smaller firms lacked both the training infrastructure (training specialists and 
budgets) and the training capacity (employees’ time and training skills) to implement training 
programs.  To truly understand the workplace practices that characterize franchises, it is 
necessary to control for these other attributes that are associated with typical franchise operations 
as they may well confound any association between job quality and franchise status. 
The few studies that control for these factors carefully are those that compare franchisee-
owned establishments to company-owned establishments, often in the same chain, e.g., a 
franchisee-owned Burger King store compared to a company-owned Burger King (e.g., Krueger, 
1991 and Bradach, 1998). This approach is very helpful for examining the effects of ownership 
structure per se, but it cannot examine the effect of franchise operating practices because the 
basic operating models are the same in company-owned and franchisee-owned operations within   8
the same chain. The nature of the relationship between franchise operations and employment 
practices therefore demands further examination, which we turn to below.  
 
Hypotheses 
Our central question, based on the conflicting implications of the literature cited above, is 
whether franchises offer lower quality jobs than do non-franchise operations.  The perception 
that they do is widespread, but whether that apparent association is due to confounding factors is 
an important empirical question. Research suggests that franchises in general are more 
sophisticated in their management practices than equivalent non-franchise operations, which 
might lead one to hypothesize that their workplace practices would also be more sophisticated 
and not necessarily the “low road” approach with which they are associated.  
Asking this question requires first establishing criteria for deciding the quality of jobs: 
What constitutes a good job?  One approach, for example, might be to compare the perceptions 
of workers themselves in franchise and non-franchise operations: Which ones are more satisfied 
with their jobs?  The difficulty with this approach is that interpreting differences in attitudes 
across jobs is very complicated because satisfaction levels are in part influenced by expectations, 
and representative attitudinal data across operations is extraordinarily difficult to obtain. A more 
straightforward approach is to examine the attributes of jobs directly.  Kalleberg, Reskin and 
Hudson, 2000 focus on three factors to measure job quality:  wage level, pension benefits and 
health insurance.  Other aspects of jobs no doubt are important as well, such as promotion 
prospects, the specific aspects of individual tasks as they relate to principles of job design,   9
relationships with superiors and other aspects of interpersonal dynamics, etc.
2  Many of these are 
complicated to measure (or even to define) and, unfortunately, are beyond the scope of the data 
that we know to exist.  We believe most observers would agree that important measures of job 
quality include aspects of the rewards from work (pay and benefits), employer investments in 
employees (training programs), and, especially in the context of franchises, work organization 
practices that affect employee involvement along the lines of high performance systems.    
An important caveat to the notion of assessing job quality is that the distinction between 
good jobs and bad jobs is somewhat arbitrary.  In fact, job quality is likely to represent a 
continuum that depends on which attributes of jobs are being examined.  And the fact that 
workers may have different preferences with respect to these attributes (e.g., some prefer part-
time work) makes even a continuum complicated to construct.   
Methods and Data 
To address the questions above, we need data that can compare the employment practices 
of franchises to equivalent non-franchises in order to control for possible confounding 
relationships. To do so, we turn to the National Employer Surveys (see Cappelli 2001 for a 
description). Conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the National Employer Surveys are 
representative surveys of all private sector, for-profit U.S. establishments with more than 20 
employees (excluding corporate headquarters). The 1994 National Employer Survey sampled 
over 4000 of these establishments. The survey was administered via Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing to a target respondent of the plant manager in manufacturing 
establishments and the local business site manager in service establishments.  The survey also 
obtained information from multiple respondents where the target respondent thought those 
                                                           
2 One could imagine controlling for the attributes of individuals holding those jobs as well in order to determine 
whether jobs are better than one would expect given the quality of the workers.  This approach answers a slightly   10
responses would be more accurate. It asked about establishment characteristics, work 
organization practices, and human resource practices.  The overall response rate was 72% with 
no apparent differences between respondents and non-respondents on dimensions such as 
industry type or size. The 1994 public use data file that resulted contains data on 3173 
establishments.  
The 1996 National Employer Survey interviewed a sub-sample of the establishments 
from the 1994 survey and also asked whether the establishment was a member of a franchise 
organization. The response rate for the 1996 survey was 75%. By matching the data from the 
1994 survey to the franchise question from 1996, we have a data set with 2136 observations that 
identifies organizational and work practices for a national sample of franchises and non-
franchised establishments.
3   
Cross-sectional data of this kind creates obvious difficulty in establishing causal 
relationships.  That concern is mitigated in this context, however, because the direction of 
causation seems clear on logical grounds.  It is straightforward to see how the decision to 
become a franchise drives work practices because the use of specific operating procedures is 
typically required by the franchise agreement.  These, in turn, either define the employment 
practices or drive employment outcomes. It is much more difficult to imagine the reverse case, 
where employment outcomes exogenously cause an establishment to become a franchise or a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
different question, though, whether jobs offer a market premium as opposed to whether they are good per se.  
3 Establishments do switch status from franchise to non-franchise and visa versa, although such changes are rare – 
Peterson and Dant (1990) found that the number of franchisees that have ever been an independent operator, e.g., 
was only 6.7 percent.   The rate of change over a short period like 1994 to 1996 is likely to be insignificant for the 
purposes of empirical analyses.  We know so little about what causes franchise status to change in either direction 
that it is difficult even to speculate as to possible relationships with the other variables. Not all franchise agreements 
are the same.  The important distinction is between “trade name” franchises, where the franchisee acquires the right 
to sell a particular product and manage its operation with considerable autonomy (e.g., a gas station’s relationship 
with an oil company) versus “business unit” franchises, where the operations are highly structured according to prior 
agreements (e.g., most fast-food chains). While we might expect relationships with work practices to be stronger for 
business unit franchises, we cannot distinguish the two in our data.        11
franchise to switch to a different ownership form.  Further, the type of work practices and 
outcomes we are considering are in no way unique to franchise status, so there is no reason to 
believe that having these practices would require that a firm take the franchise form.   
A different concern with respect to estimation is whether franchise status and work 
practices are determined simultaneously. Simultaneous observations could bias OLS estimators 
asymptotically, although OLS estimation may still be preferred over other forms (e.g., by being 
more robust).  Again, the process through which franchise operations take place suggests that 
franchise status occurs first and then work practices follow.  While they may appear to be 
simultaneous in the sense that most franchise firms begin operations with their work practices in 
place, the actual process is invariably that operators decide to become a franchise and then roll 
out the operating procedures, which include work practices.   
 
Variables and Analyses 
The arguments above at least satisfy the requirement of Granger Causation and suggest 
that simple regression models are sufficient to establish the estimates of the relationship between 
franchise status and work practices and associated outcomes.   Among the primary variables to 
consider in deciding whether franchises offer good jobs are wages, which we measure separately 
for managerial and non-managerial (typically front-line) workers.
4  This measure is for full-time 
workers.  It would be useful to have similar data for part-time workers as well but such data is 
unavailable. We also include a count of how many among 10 important benefits the 
establishment offers its employees.  All of these benefits add fixed costs to employment and are 
typically seen as practices that help create attachment between firms and employees. Not all   12
benefits are equal in terms of value or cost, of course, and there is a wide range of possible 
analyses one could conduct to examine relationships with benefits.  This approach at least has the 
benefit of parsimony.
5   
Another important variable is the extent of training offered to employees, which we 
measure with three variables: First, whether the establishment has a written training program or 
policy in place, second, the percentage of employees who receive formal training each year, and 
third, the number of hours of formal training employees receive each year.  The last two 
variables are measured separately for managerial and non-managerial employees.   
One way to capture the extent of pay, benefits, training, and other expenditures on 
employees is with a single measure of total labor costs.  This variable comes from the 1997 
National Employer Survey, which asks about expenditures for 1996, the year for which the 
franchise question is collected. 
6 We also include other measures of job quality – the percentage 
of workers who have part-time status, the average education level of the workforce (measured 
separately for management and non-management employees), and a proxy for turnover and 
tenure.  Actual turnover measures are not available, only the percentage of the workforce with 
less than one year of tenure.  This measure is important in its own right as an indication of the 
extent of new hires in the workplace.  It should vary directly with turnover, but it, like all 
measures of tenure, can be confounded by employment growth: Growing companies, other 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 The original question in the survey asked for average hourly pay, but because not all establishments had 
compensation data in that format, they were allowed to report it as weekly, monthly, or hourly pay.  The reports 
were therefore converted to a standard metric of annual salaries based on 40 hour workweeks and 52 week years. 
5 The benefits are: pension, severance pay, health insurance, dental insurance, life insurance, sick pay, paid 
vacations/holidays, family leave (this was before the Family and Medical Leave Act), grievance/complaint 
procedures, and stock options.   
6 The size control variable helps to adjust for difference in labor costs based simply on having more employees.  Per 
employee measures have important caveats, though, in that establishments may differ in their use of part-time labor 
and overtime hours.  If franchises make greater use of part-time workers, e.g.,  then their labor cost per employee 
measure should be understated compared to the true expenditure per unit of labor. 
   13
things equal, have lower tenure independent of turnover rates.  Because employment growth 
rates are not available, it is important to recognize that this measure is an imperfect proxy for 
turnover.   
We also have two measures for high performance work systems that have been used in 
previous studies.  The first is the percentage of the workforce involved in regularly scheduled 
meetings to discuss workplace problems.  This measure captures something about the extent of 
employee participation in the workplace, but it is also fair to say that it is an imperfect measure 
as we do not know how much involvement employees truly have in these discussions. The 
second measure is whether the establishment has a total quality management program.  Hackman 
and Wageman’s (1995) study of TQM practices found that problem-solving teams, a central 
aspect of high performance systems, was the most common attribute of TQM programs.  
In addition, we control for establishment size (measured as the logarithm of the number 
of employees working at the establishment in 1996) and the industry that the establishment 
operates in (measured by ten binary variables, the omitted category is “Other manufacturing”). 
Table 1 presents a description of the ten industries.  
We do not have detailed measures of the human capital and demographics of the 
employees in these establishments other than their average education level.  The focus here is on 
the jobs per se, but attributes of the employees would allow us to answer other questions as well, 
such as whether franchises disproportionately employ younger workers or whether they pay a 
premium for equivalent workers as compared to non-franchises.  
The analyses below begin with difference-of-means tests for franchise and non-franchise 
establishments followed by regression models that control for the most important characteristics 
of establishments that may be spuriously associated with the franchise form. Because the   14
analyses are examining the possible effect of the franchise form on various practices and aspects 
of employment, each such aspect in measured by a different dependent variable and is therefore 
essentially a separate model.  Whether each equation should have a unique model specification 
based on its own theoretical underpinnings is an important question.  Without an established 
literature to define what such models should look like in each case, however, it is not obvious 
what characteristics or management practices other than industry, size, and establishment age are 
truly exogenous to franchise status and therefore should be controlled for in the equation.  There 
are also advantages of consistency in using the same model across equations. 
In addition to direct effects, franchise status may also have indirect effects on the 
dependent variables considered here through relationships with other variables. For example, 
greater use of part-time jobs may reduce average education levels. If the goal is to see what the 
net effect of franchise operations is, then it is sufficient to examine the reduced form of what are 
no doubt more complicated relationships: By leaving out possible control variables that could be 
endogenous to franchise status, all of the possible indirect effects appear together in the franchise 
coefficient.   This approach is sufficient to address the question as to whether franchises are 
associated with good jobs.  The caveat is that it does not answer the more complicated question 
concerning why franchise jobs might be better or worse.  
Results 
  Table 1 provides descriptive detail on some of the characteristics of franchises in the U.S. 
by size and industry classification. Smaller establishments (with less than 100 employees) 
contain a slightly greater proportion of franchises than in the overall population (8 versus 5.4 
percent). Mid-size establishments (between 101 and 435 employees) have about the same 
proportion of franchises as in the economy as a whole, while larger establishments   15
(establishments with more than 435 employees) have about half as many franchise organizations 
as in the overall economy (3 versus 5.4 percent).  Franchises are quite rare in manufacturing. 
They represent 2.2 percent of organizations in the manufacturing sector versus 5.4 percent in the 
whole economy. The distribution of franchise organizations in the service sector is twice as great 
as in the economy as a whole (10.9 vs. 5.4 percent), and franchises are disproportionately 
concentrated in retail (31.1 percent), in hotels and restaurants (29.7 percent) and in business 
services (11.8 percent). They are roughly in proportion to the economy as a whole in most of the 
other service industries.  As one would expect, franchise status appears to be related strongly to 
other important attributes of employers.  
 
-- Insert Table 1 about here – 
 
The difference-of-means tests in Table 2 show that in terms of human capital, franchises 
pay lower wages and salaries both to their non-managerial workers (20.5 vs. 24.7 thousand USD, 
p<.001) and to their managerial employees (40.6 vs. 49.1 thousand USD, p<.01). They employ 
three times as many part-time workers (6 vs. 18%, p<.001) and twice as many employees who 
have less than one year of tenure with the organization (27 vs. 14%, p<.001). The results seem 
consistent with the stereotype of “bad” jobs, although franchises are significantly more likely to 
have a formal training policy (72 vs. 58%, p<.01) and, on balance, they may provide more 
training both in terms of the percentage of employees trained and total training hours. What we 
cannot know from these results is the extent to which the differences in Table 2 are driven by 
franchise status per se or other attributes that are associated with franchises.  
- Insert Tables 2 &3 Here -   16
The regressions presented in Table 3 control for industry and the size and age of the 
organization. The results are strikingly different from those in the difference in means tests.  
There are no significant differences with respect to pay or benefits for franchises; the signs of the 
variables actually point toward higher pay and benefits for franchises.  The results for training 
are consistent with the idea that franchises provide more extensive and intensive formal training 
to their employees than do non-franchise operations.  Franchise operations are more likely to 
have a formal training policy (ß=.45, p<.1), they train a significantly higher percentage of their 
non-managerial workforce (ß=9.34, p<.05) and they provide more training hours per employee 
(ß=.4, p<.05). And overall, labor costs per employee are higher in franchise operations.  There is 
no support for the idea that franchises pursue a strategy of lower expenditures on employees.  
Franchises also appear to make greater use of work organization practices associated with 
employee involvement, such as work-related meetings (ß=2.26, p<.1) and TQM practices (ß=.56, 
p<.01).       
On the other hand, franchises do employ non-managerial employees with fewer years of 
education (ß=-.19, p<.1), they have a higher percentage of part-time workers (ß=.03, p<.05), and 
have a higher percentage of employees with less than one year of tenure on the job (ß=4.43, 
p<.01) than do non-franchise operations.  
  The size of the coefficients on the control variables remind us just how important basic 
factors like industry and establishment size are in determining employment outcomes.   
Consistent with the argument that larger employers provide better working conditions (Brown, 
Hamilton and Medoff, 1990), large-sized establishments in this sample are also significantly 
more likely to have higher labor costs, provide higher pay for their managers and for their non-
managerial staff, make more investment into the training of their employees, and hire employees   17
of higher human capital.   But the effects associated with franchise status are also sizeable:  
Controlling for industry and employment levels, for example, franchises spend $170,000 more 
per year on employees than do non-franchises. 
From among the industry controls, the comparison of the “Franchise” variable with the 
“Hotels and restaurants industry” and “Retail” controls provides useful insights, given that most 
of the franchises examined in the extant literature operate in these two industry classifications 
(e.g. Bradach, 1998; Leidner, 1993; Royle, 2000). The predictor “Franchise” often has the 
opposite coefficient than the predictors “Hotels and restaurants” and “Retail”, showing that 
franchises do take a different approach to managing their employees than establishments in the 
hotels and restaurants and retail industries per se.  In separate analyses, available on request, we 
examine the interaction between the hotel/restaurant industry variable and franchise status.  The 
coefficient of the interaction variable across the models in Table 3 generally suggests that 
franchises in that industry provide better employment outcomes, although the results are 
significant in only about one-third of the cases, possibly because the number of observations in 
that industry (101) is relatively small. 
  Finally, the control variable that measures the establishment’s turnover rate is significant 
in all but three of the equations where it is included. Establishments with a higher turnover rate 
provide lower pay and fewer benefits both to their managerial and non-managerial employees. 
Their managers and non-managerial employees have lower education levels, and fewer of them 
are involved in work-related meetings. Such establishments are also less likely to have TQM 
practices. 
   18
Discussion and Conclusions 
This study is the first to use nationally representative data to examine franchise 
operations and their work practices in detail. The basic question we investigate is whether 
franchise forms of operation are associated with lower quality jobs. The results above suggest 
that this bad jobs stereotype in franchises may have been based on confounding attributes   
associated with franchises rather than franchise status per se. Franchises are concentrated in 
smaller establishments, which have fewer resources, and in industries like hotels and restaurants, 
which have lower-quality jobs. But within those sectors, franchise operations appear to offer 
more sophisticated management practices and to make greater investments in their employees. 
Once we control for size and industry, we find little evidence that jobs are worse in franchises 
and considerable evidence that they are better than in equivalent, non-franchise operations.   
While there is some evidence that franchises may hire less qualified workers (in terms of 
education) and use more part-time roles, they spend more on these workers, offer them more 
training, and are more likely to engage them in employee involvement-related work systems than 
do non-franchise establishments. A fair assessment might be that franchise jobs offer more to 
lower-quality workers.    
A related question is whether franchise operations appear to be closer to the scientific 
management model or the high commitment model for managing employees.  The bad jobs 
argument, especially directed at fast food companies like McDonald’s, emphasizes deskilled jobs 
based on approaches that look much like scientific management. On the other hand, the fact that 
franchises are generally seen as more advanced in their management practices than equivalent 
non-franchise operations suggests that they would be more likely to use high performance work 
practices than non-franchise operations.  Franchises do hire less educated front-line employees,   19
as one would expect from scientific management, but the fact that they spend more money on 
their employees is certainly inconsistent with the goal of scientific management, which is to 
lower employee costs by deskilling jobs. We also find no evidence that franchises use better paid 
and educated managers, as scientific management implies.
7  But the most compelling evidence 
that franchises are closer to the high performance model is that they make greater use of systems 
associated with employee involvement and teamwork.  Data that could measure more precisely 
the tasks individual workers perform and the aspects of their job design would be helpful in 
establishing more clearly the extent to which franchises make use of scientific management as an 
organizing principle.  Additional data on the attributes of the employees might also make it 
possible to tell whether franchisees treat equivalent workers better and whether, for example, 
they offer efficiency wage levels of compensation. 
One conclusion to be drawn from the results above is that jobs cannot necessarily be 
classified easily into categories of good and bad.  The particular choice of attributes and the mix 
of outcomes across them suggest that we might need a much more sophisticated system of 
classifying to reveal how they stack up for workers.  
Several important puzzles remain about franchises and work practices, though.  An 
obvious question is why franchises invest more in training but also appear to have higher 
turnover at least as measured by more low-tenure workers because training investments are lost 
when workers leave.  Franchise training and other arrangements could be structured to earn a 
return in a shorter time period; it is also possible that turnover at franchises is actually lower than 
one would expect given the characteristics of the workers they hire (e.g., less educated).  But this  
                                                           
7 An alternative that we cannot examine is that franchises concentrate management skill requirements at 
headquarters where the operating systems are designed, allowing them to use lower quality, lower paid managers in 
the establishments.    20
explanation leads to the more general question that has yet to be answered clearly: What is the 
comparative advantage of franchises? Spending more per employee than non-franchise 
operations would appear to put franchises at a considerable cost disadvantage that somehow has 
to be offset – possibly through superior productivity or some other method of adding value.  It is 
clear, though, that the competitive advantage of franchises is not based on a model of spending 
less on its employees.  The fact that they continue to exist and at least in many areas thrive 
against non-franchise forms suggests that they must be able to offset the labor cost disadvantage 
in other ways.   
A logical explanation for the above would be that franchises have productivity 
advantages over non-franchise forms. Unfortunately there is little research on this issue, due to 
the difficulty of accessing data on franchise financial performance in part because most franchise 
chains are privately owned (Combs, Michael and Castrogiovanni, 2004). The papers that do look 
at financial performance compare the performance of the various franchisee-owned outlets 
(Combs, Ketchen and Hoover, 2004; Darr, Argote and Epple, 1995; Hennessy, 2003), or the 
franchisee- and company-owned units of the same chain (Sorenson and Sørensen, 2001; Thomas, 
O’Hara and Musgrave, 1990). The financial performance of franchises vs. non-franchise forms 
remains for future research to examine. The place to begin would be with the hypothesis that the 
greater use of practices such as TQM and training in franchises drives higher performance and 
offsets the labor cost difference.   
 
   21
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Table 1. Descriptive Characteristics of Franchise Organizations* 
 






Between 20 and 100 employees 
 
652 57  8.04 
Between 101 and 435 employees 
 
687 37  5.11 
More than 435 employees 
 
682 21  2.99 
Total 2021  115  5.38 
* Census concerns about data disclosure require that information about the franchise variable be 








Food and tobacco 
 
98 6  5.77 
Transportation equipment, machinery 
and computers, and instruments 
 
242 9  3.59 
Other manufacturing: textile and 
apparel, lumber and paper, printing and 
publishing, chemicals and petroleum 
and Primary and fabricated metals 
 
871 12  1.36 
Construction 
 
101 3  2.88 
Transportation, communication, 
utilities and wholesale trade 
 
286 16  5.30 
Retail  
 
61 19  31.15 
Finance and insurance 
 
142 6  5.41 
Business services 
 
75 10  11.76 
Health services 
 
74 4  5.13 
Hotels, restaurants 
 
71 30  29.70 
Total 2021  115  5.38 
 Table 1. Continued: Means, standard deviations and Pearson correlations for key variables in the analyses 
 
Variable  Mean  St.d.  1 2  3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12  13  14  15 
1.  Franchise 
2.  TQM 
3.  Meetings 
4.  Educ, managers 
5.  Educ, non-mgr. 
6.  Pay, managers 
7.  Pay, non-mgr. 
8.  Benefits 
9.  % part-timers 
10. % w. low tenure 
11. Training policy 
12. %manager trained 
13. Lg hour, manager 
14. %non-mgr trained 

































































































































































































































































Correlations higher than .06 are significant at p<.05. Correlations higher than .07 are significant at p<.01. Correlations higher than .09 are significant at p<.001. 
 
Definition of the variables 
1.  The establishment is part of a franchise (1. Yes; 0. No) 
2.  Establishment adopted a formal Total Quality Management program (1. Yes; 0. No) 
3.  Percentage of non-managerial employees involved in regularly scheduled meetings to discuss work-related problems  
4.  Average number of years of completed schooling for managers 
5.  Average number of years of completed schooling for non-managerial employees 
6.  Annual pay for managers (thousand USD) 
7.  Annual pay for non-managerial employees (thousand USD) 
8.  Count of provision of  ten employee benefits: pension plan, severance plan, health insurance, dental care benefits, child care subsidies, family leave, 
formal grievance procedures, life insurance, sick pay, paid vacation/holidays and stock options 
9.  The number of permanent part-time employees at your establishment.  
10.  The percentage of current permanent employees who have been with the establishment for less than one year 
11.  The establishment has a formal/written training policy (1. Yes; 0. No) 
12.  The percentage of managers who received formal training during the past year 
13.  Natural log of manager’s hourly pay 
14.  The percentage of non-managerial employees who received formal training during the past year 
15.  Natural log of non-managerial hourly pay   28
Table 2. The Employment Practices of Franchise and Non-franchise Establishments: Means, standard deviations and 
difference of means t-tests 
 
 
Franchise Non-franchise    Employment Practices 
Mean  s.d. Mean  s.d. t-test 
TQM  52.63 50.15 51.77  49.98 0.18 
Work-related  meetings  54.77 41.48 49.41  42.18 1.34 
Education,  managers  14.86  1.90 15.27  1.80 2.28* 
Education, non-managerial employees   12.06  1.80  12.47  1.32  2.42* 
Average  pay  for  managers  40,585 22,341 49,070  20,354 3.48** 
Average pay for non-managerial employees  20,492  12,342  24,743  11,264  3.26*** 
Provision of ten benefits  6.50  2.30  7.03  1.96  2.43* 
Percentage  of  part-time  employees  18.72 23.96 6.14  13.68 5.58*** 
Percentage of employees with the organization for less than a year  26.57  27.41  14.45  15.98  4.69*** 
Percentage of organizations with a formal training policy  72.17  45.01  57.91  49.38  3.29** 
Percentage  of  managerial  employees  trained  48.06 35.68 48.93  37.25 0.23 
Average number of training hours for managerial employees  62.23  124.86  34.11  56.08  2.13* 
Percentage of non-managerial employees  trained  36.68 34.23 28.18  28.17 2.38* 
Average number of training hours provided to  non-managerial  employees  55.55 88.42 50.60  92.95 0.47 
 
Total N = 2136; Franchise N = 115; Non-franchise N = 2021 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01 * p < .05 
 
 
Table 3. The effect of franchise membership on employment outcomes  
 

























DV: Percentage of 
employees with 
less than 1 year on 
the job 
OLS regression 
Variables  Coeff              (st. er.)  Coeff         (st. 
err) 




Machine     
Construction 
Transportation       
Retail 
Finance  
Business services  
Health  
Hotel and rest. 
Est age 
% low tenure  
Constant 
170026.6**    (57721.92) 
62474.41***  (7519.8) 
111684.5**    (41046.4) 
-3928.24        (28670.86) 
40128.45       (42080.24) 
50749.21       (32917.54) 
-11185.34      (87642.33) 
28154.49       (55043.5) 
-12182.94     (61179.11) 
-33133.02     (58409.18) 
-26180.53     (68330.58) 
 
 
-281691.3***   (45178) 
.63             (1.15) 
1.71***     (.19) 
-3.41**      (1.16) 
-1.01          (.80) 
10.94***   (1.21)   
7.17***     (.79) 
-4.77***   (1.43) 
4.66***    (1.19) 
9.18***    (1.43) 
-2.06         (1.56) 
-4.49***   (1.21) 
.02+          (.01) 
-.17***     (.02) 
16.03***  (1.12) 
.12          (.17) 
.61***    (.03) 
.06          (.18) 
.17          (.12) 
-.88***   (.17) 
.55***    (.11) 
.10          (.20) 
1.20***  (.15) 
.03          (.20) 
.05          (.20) 
-.42*       (.19) 
.01**      (.00) 
-.02***  (.00) 
3.68***  (.16) 
-.19+      (.11) 
.10***    (.02) 
-.16         (.12) 
.16*        (.08) 
 .26*       (.11) 
.67***   (.07) 
.28*       (.13) 
.99***   (.10) 
1.24*** (.13) 
.40**     (.13) 
.51***   (.13) 
-.00       (.00) 
-.01*** (.00) 
11.70*** (.11) 
.03*       (.01) 
-.01+     (.00) 
.00         (.01) 
-.01        (.01) 
.01         (.01) 
.04***   (.01) 
.34***   (.01) 
.06***   (.01) 
.10***   (.01) 
.21***   (.01) 
.16***   (.01) 
-.00       (.00) 
.00**    (.00) 
3.29*** (1.6) 
4.43**     (1.59) 
.02           (.26) 
5.48**     (1.66) 
-2.37*      (1.14) 
5.65**     (1.64) 
-1.36        (1.08) 
12.70*** (1.92) 
1.70         (1.43) 
15.20*** (1.84) 
7.40***   (1.88) 
19.56*** (1.71) 
-.10***    (.01) 
 
15.48*** (1.52) 
  N = 654 
F = 8.34*** 
R2=.13 
N =1627 
F = 39.3*** 
R2 = .241 
N = 2055 
F = 71.2*** 
R2 = .31 
N=1930 
F = 18.6*** 
R2 = .11 
N=2055 
Chi2 = 853.21*** 
Ps. R2 = .41 
N=2055 
F= 35.2*** 
R2 = .17 
 
 
+p<.1,  *p<.05,  **p<.01,  ***p<.001 
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Table 3 continued. The effect of franchise establishments on employee management  
 

























Machine     
Construction 
Transportation       
Retail 
Finance  
Business services  
Health  
Hotel and rest. 
Est age 
% low tenure  
Constant 
2.26+        (1.18) 
1.16***    (.18) 
-.28           (1.16) 
.78            (.82) 
1.36          (1.14) 
.60            (.75) 
-.08           (1.32) 
4.94***    (1.17) 
-.23          (1.28) 
.96           (1.30) 
3.14**     (1.28) 
.00           (.01) 
-.03*        (.01) 
7.76***   (1.09) 
.56**      (.23) 
.42***    (.037) 
-.11         (.23) 
.39*        (.16) 
-.83***   (.24) 
-.67***   (.15) 
-.55*       (.27) 
 -.59**    (.20) 
-.37         (.26) 
.09          (.26) 
-.56*       (.24) 
-.01*       (.00) 
-.01**     (.00) 
-1.77*** (.22) 
.45+         (.23) 
.34***     (.04) 
.06           (.22) 
-.15          (.15) 
-.16          (.22) 
.41**       (.15) 
1.12***   (.29) 
.41*         (.20) 
.36           (.25) 
1.26***   (.29) 
.70**       (.25) 
-.00+       (.00) 
8.95e-06  (.00) 
-1.57***  (.22) 
.40*         (.17) 
.17***     (.03) 
-.09          (.18) 
.02           (.12) 
-.53**      (.18) 
-.18          (.12) 
-.30          (.21) 
.36*         (.17) 
-.63**      (.20) 
-.15          (.22) 
-.40*        (.19) 
.00           (.00) 
-.00          (.00) 
1.29***   (.17) 
9.34*           ( 4.31) 
4.60***       (.70) 
-2.63            (4.57) 
1.97             (3.05) 
-14.39**      (4.29) 
-7.17*          (2.88) 
-10.75*        (5.28) 
16.66***     (3.93) 
-19.84***    (5.01) 
5.29             (5.30) 
-17.36***   (4.65) 
-.01             (.04) 
-.01             (.06) 
28.35***    (4.19) 
 N=  1998 
Chi2(13) = 73.6*** 
Pseudo R2 = .01 
N = 2040 
Chi2(13) = 260.8***
Pseudo R2 = .09 
N = 2037 
Chi2(13)=139.5*** 
Pseudo R2 = .06 
N = 1567 
Chi2(13)=93.1*** 
Pseudo R2 = .02  
N =1675 
F = 10.61*** 
R2 = .08 
 
 
+p<.1,  *p<.05,  **p<.01,  ***p<.001 
 
 
                                                           
8 Tobit estimation was used because some establishments report no training of employees, and in those cases, the variable is missing.   31
Table 3 continued. The effect of franchise establishments on employee management: Evidence for managerial employees 
 
  DV: Pay for managers 
 
OLS regression 
DV: Education for 
managers 
OLS regression 
DV: Log of training 
hours for managers 
Tobit estimates 
DV: Percentage of 
managers trained 
Tobit estimate 




Machine     
Construction 
Transportation       
Retail 
Finance  
Business services  
Health  
Hotel and rest. 
Est age 
% low tenure  
Constant 
1.34           (2.23) 
2.49***     (.36) 
-2.09          (2.44) 
1.07           (1.68) 
5.11*         (2.20) 
1.13           (1.50) 
-13.31***  (2.74) 
.52             (2.10) 
-1.99         (2.58) 
-7.21**     (2.58) 
-16.94*** (2.42) 
.00            (.02) 
-.21***     (.03) 
39.71***  (2.18) 
-.05           (.15) 
.25***      (.03) 
-.02           (.16) 
.29**        (.11) 
-.19          (.16) 
.13           (.10) 
-.15          (.19) 
.94***     (.14) 
1.04***   (.18) 
1.08***   (.19) 
-.11          (.18) 
-.00          (.00) 
-.01***    (.00) 
13.05*** (.15) 
.37*          (.17) 
.19***      (.03) 
.03            (.17) 
.14            (.12) 
-.39*         (.16) 
.15            (.11) 
.04 .          (19) 
.29*          (.15) 
-.05           (.19) 
-.08           (.19) 
-.07           (.18) 
.00            (.00) 
-.00           (.00) 
1.18***    (.16) 
1.23          (1.95) 
3.05***    (.34) 
-1.28         (2.01) 
.03            (1.42) 
-4.54**     (1.74) 
1.19          (1.30) 
-.03           (2.21) 
6.16**      (1.98) 
-1.48         (2.03) 
.53            (2.28) 
1.63       (2.17) 
.00            (.02) 
-.01          (.02) 
4.12*       (1.84) 
  N = 1531 
F (13, 1517) = 20.9*** 
R2 = .15 
N = 1930 
F (13, 1916) = 19.08*** 
R2 = .11 
N = 1623 
Chi2 (13) = 82.87*** 
Pseudo R2 = .01 
N = 1741 
Chi2 = 126.58*** 
Pseudo R2=.03 
 
+p<.1,  *p<.05,  **p<.01,  ***p<.001 
 
  